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positive probability by the government only when the ruling party is perceived relatively more
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advantage regarding its perceived extremism by the electorate. Equilibrium dynamics produce two
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probability of non-moderate policies in the future for a protracted period of time; the other possible
adjustment path produces moderation with probability one in all periods. Both adjustment paths
are such that one of the two parties (possibly diﬀerent over time) may win successive elections with
high probability in equilibrium.
Keywords: Parliamentary Dynamics, Reputation, Westminster.
1First draft: April 6, 2005; this draft: July 30, 2006.
2Previous title: Dynamics of Westminster Parliamentarism. Thanks to Keith Krehbiel, and John Roemer, for their
feedback. I have also beneﬁted from helpful comments from audiences at the 2005 MPSA meeting, the University of
Crete, the Athens University of Economics and Business, the 2005 SED conference, Budapest, and Cornell University.
I am responsible for all errors.
3Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Rochester. Correspondence Address: De-
partment of Political Science, University of Rochester, Harkness Hall 333, Rochester, NY 14627-0146. E-mail: aka-
landr@mail.rochester.edu. Web: http://mail.rochester.edu/~akalandr/.
11. INTRODUCTION
The theory of two party/candidate competition has been dominated by the ‘convergence to
the median’ theorem of Hotelling, 1929, and Downs, 1957. Their stark model provides compelling
support for the intuition that candidates endorse moderate policies in order to attain oﬃce. De-
spite its appeal, Downsian electoral competition has the unfortunate implication that politics do not
matter in equilibrium, since candidates adopt identical equilibrium policy positions. An alternative
is obtained under the assumption that candidates have policy motivations and face electoral uncer-
tainty. Under these conditions, Wittman, 1983, 1990, (see also Calvert, 1985) deduces equilibrium
policies that are located away from the median. Both models generate ideals with trivial electoral
dynamics, since these models imply either persistent policy convergence or (partial) divergence over
time. At least with regard to partisan competition, empirical observation suggests otherwise.
For instance, Downsian convergence seems to be a fair approximation of the world of British
politics in the 50’s and 60’s. But, this era of the “politics of consensus” (Kavanagh & Morris, 1994)
came to an end in the 80’s with the governments of Margaret Thatcher. Recently, after almost two
decades of perceived divergence, British politics seem to be, once more, closer to the Downsian
ideal. To take another two-party parliamentary system as an example, policy moderation may
appear consistent with Greek politics in the mid to late 90’s, yet the preceding period since 1974
featured intense policy polarization between the two parties contesting for power in this country.
There is a second count on which static models of electoral competition are inconsistent with
empirical observation. In these models both candidates are in principle able to be competitive in
elections. For example, barring a non-anonymous resolution of voters’ indiﬀerence, a candidate can
perform at least as well as the opponent in Downs’ model by adopting a platform at the median’s
position. In table 1 we provide electoral results since the end of the second world war for three
countries (the UK, New Zealand until 1996, and Greece since 1974) with parliamentary systems
in which two parties alternate in power. As is evident from these data, one of the two competing
parties often holds a persistent advantage in consecutive elections. Contemporary analysts of British
politics speak of Labour’s domination over the Tories, but similar claims were made for the Tories
in the 80s. In the case of New Zealand, the advantage of the conservative National party appears
almost systemic.
[insert table 1 about here]
2We take the view that a signiﬁcant source for the discrepancy between empirical observation
and the theoretical predictions of variants of Downs’s model of electoral competition is the assump-
tion made in these models that parties are able to commit to a policy platform prior to the election.
We argue that the assumption of pre-election platform commitment cannot be easily defended in
the case of partisan competition. As a matter of fact, there do not exist actual contracts or other
constitutional provisions that can literally secure commitment by political parties on pre-election
platforms. Hence, existing justiﬁcations for this assumption are indirect and take two modal forms.
The ﬁrst justiﬁcation posits that parties essentially commit by electing a leader with known
policy preferences. Of course, party leadership is not a guaranteed position for those who attain it,
and leaders’ inﬂuence on the party’s actions cannot reach too far beyond the boundaries that stem
from the fact that a leader is an agent of the party. In fact, even if there exist candidate leaders
with ‘known’ policy preferences, in typical two-party parliamentary systems partisan rules do not
prevent challengers from contesting for leadership at any point in time. Speculation about such
challenges to incumbent leaders abound, even while parties are in oﬃce.4 The fact that leadership
replacements are not frequent is merely a reﬂection of the equilibrium eﬀect that leaders yield to
suﬃciently strong internal party pressures in order to prevent such challenges. That means that,
contrary to what is required for platform commitment, if partisan preferences dictate otherwise, a
party may implement a diﬀerent policy than the one it endorsed prior to the elections or the one
its leader had endorsed in the past.
The second justiﬁcation for assuming platform commitment, is that it constitutes a reduced
form way of modelling electoral competition as a repeated game. In this repeated game, parties
adhere to past platform promises in equilibrium for one of two reasons. One possibility, is that
voters’ strategies in this repeated game involve ‘retrospective’ punishment threats, so that parties
reneging from their campaign promise face the prospect of future punishment by the electorate.
These complex punishment strategies on the part of the electorate, though, are both empirically
inconsistent and theoretically problematic. Allowing for such complex strategies leads to theoretical
indeterminacy in these models (e.g., Duggan and Fey, 2004). Given the typical length of the electoral
cycle, it is also implausible to expect that voters will coordinate to vote against a party they prefer
in order to punish that party for its actions in government eight or ten years in the past.
4Furthermore, the timing of leadership replacement is sometimes unpredictable and surprising,
as, for example, in the case of Margaret Thatcher’s replacement by John Major.
3On the other hand, a second, more plausible, possibility is that voters do vote against a party
that took an undesirable policy action in the past because they have updated aversely regarding
the true policy preferences within that party and they no longer prefer that party. We emphasize
the important distinction5 that in this second possibility, voters are forward looking. They simply
evaluate the credibility of the parties and the positions they take on the basis of their past record
of behavior. As a result, parties may have the incentive to remain consistent to their platforms in
order to build a reputation that will help the party win future elections. We claim that this type
of reputational incentive, instead of actual policy commitment, is central in shaping party policy
choices. Yet, to date, we know of no study of dynamic partisan competition that explicitly focuses
on party reputations and their role on political actors’ behavior.
The objective of the present paper is to propose a reputation based dynamic theory of party
competition. We combine premises of the models of Downs and Wittman, assuming partisans with
am i x t u r eo fo ﬃce and policy motivations. We assume that parties are populated by individuals
with diﬀerent policy preferences. The prevailing policy preferences within the party are not publicly
known. Although a party’s preferences are correlated from period to period, these preferences may
change over time due to exogenous shifts in the balance of power within the party. True party
preferences are (possibly) revealed to the electorate through policy consequential choices of this
p a r t yw h e ni ti si ng o v e r n m e n t .
Since the electorate operates under incomplete information regarding prevailing policy pref-
erences within political parties, and since partisans desire to win oﬃce, party platform declarations
prior to the elections are received by the electorate with a grain of salt. Indeed, both platform
declarations or even past policies may be strategic choices by partisans with the intention to please
or deceive the electorate regarding the true policy preferences that prevail within the party. Thus,
in our model we dispense with pre-election policy announcements altogether.6 In our theory, par-
ties enter the electoral arena with a reputation regarding the level of their policy extremism. This
5There is a second important distinction that, since we assume party reputations that vary over
time, dynamic interaction takes the form of a stochastic game instead of a repeated game.
6This is not to say that platforms and electoral campaigns are irrelevant. Our view is that a big
part of the information contained in these political activities concerns the ability of the candidates
to prioritize among policy areas as well as their ability to innovate in proposing solutions to extant
policy problems. The mere successful (or not) execution of the campaign under the pressure of the
imminent elections conveys information about the abilities of the candidates.
4reputation is endogenously formed and reﬂects the accumulated history of electoral outcomes and
policy choices that have transpired prior to the elections. The electorate then chooses between the
parties on the basis of their reputations. If the party that is elected in government is actually con-
trolled by policy extremists these representatives face the following strategic dilemma: to pursue a
moderate policy, thus preserving or enhancing the party’s reputation, or to damage that reputation
by pursuing a desirable extreme policy?
Revealing the party’s extremism is consequential in our model because we assume that parties,
like all organizations, display inertia. Thus, if a party tarnishes its good reputation by implementing
an extreme policy while in government, this revelation aﬀects the electorate’s beliefs for several
electoral cycles.7 We formalize this idea by assuming that following electoral defeat parties undergo
an internal change that probabilistically determines the prevailing group within the party, and that
the outcome of this lottery displays positive serial correlation: extremists have a higher probability
of prevailing within the party if the party was controlled by extremists in the previous period.
The combination of these two simple premises (the endogenous formation of party reputations
along with the assumption of inertia in the determination of party preferences) produces a rich
set of insights into the workings of two party competition. Our ﬁrst result is that our model is
inconsistent with Downsian convergence to the median, no matter how oﬃce oriented parties are.
There does not exist a robust equilibrium in which parties in government implement moderate
policies with probability one independent of their combined reputations. If parties are impatient
or place signiﬁcant emphasis on policy relative to oﬃce, the only equilibrium involves party types
implementing their ideal policy independent of the electorate’s beliefs about the two parties. In
the more interesting case when parties assign high weight on oﬃce utility relative to policy, we ask
the following three questions: for what levels of reputation for the two parties do party extremists
pursue extreme policies when in government? Under what conditions are such policies observed in
equilibrium? And what are the resultant electoral and policy dynamics?
We show that parties controlled by extremists pursue extreme policies with positive probabil-
ity while in government when their party’s reputation is relatively worse than that of the opposition
(on or oﬀ the equilibrium path). In other words, extreme policies may be pursued by the government
7Again, British politics provide a good example. During Thatcher’s term, and for consecutive
elections, the Labour party attempted to present an ideologically reformed, more moderate facade,
but these attempts (at least ex post) seem to have been discounted by the electorate which became
convinced of the reform only recently.
5if the government faces an electoral disadvantage. This occurs even though we allow the electorate
to devise retrospective voting strategies such that a government that implements an extreme policy
is ousted from oﬃce with probability one. This result reﬂects a more general principle that stems
from our focus on party reputations. The principle dictates that the choices of the governing party
are not independent of the reputation of the opposition party in relation to the government’s own
reputation.
Second, extreme policies are observed along the equilibrium path if and only if two conditions
hold (a) both parties are perceived to be extreme with a probability that exceeds a given steady
state reputation level, and (b) neither party holds a signiﬁcant reputation advantage compared to its
opponent. In other words, if both parties have relatively bad reputations, a government may pursue
extreme policies following a close election. By ‘close’ we mean an election in which both parties have
similar reputation levels. Policy extremism by the government along the equilibrium path occurs
due to a regression to the mean mechanism. A party that was perceived to be relatively extreme
prior to its electoral defeat enjoys an improved reputation while in opposition, since the party
undergoes changes that move it closer to moderation with higher probability. Thus, a government
that is elected with a bare reputation advantage, is bound to appear worse than the opposition in
the election that follows its electoral victory. As we already discussed, governments with such a
disadvantage may pursue extreme policies in equilibrium.
Third, with regard to policy dynamics, the equilibrium produces two qualitatively diﬀerent
adjustment paths depending on initial conditions. Either there is positive probability of extreme
policies in the future for a protracted period of time, when parties’ reputations are worse than
a given steady state level; or there is zero probability of future extreme policies in the opposite
case. Thus, unlike in the static models of Downs or Wittman, two-party parliamentary systems
may experience spells of (relative) extremism or moderation. In the long-run, parties’ perceived
extremism converges to levels that guarantee moderate policies with probability one.
Finally, with respect to electoral dynamics, the equilibrium is consistent with the empirical
evidence we report in table 1. Along the equilibrium adjustment path one of the two parties may
hold a signiﬁcant electoral advantage for protracted periods of time. In the absence of probabilistic
elections, this electoral advantage is speciﬁc to one of the two parties in the case of the equilibrium
adjustment path with policy moderation. In the adjustment path with policy polarization, the
electoral advantage may alternate between the two parties over time.
6Before we review related literature, we conclude with a remark on the applicability of our
model which is conﬁned to partisan, not individual candidacies. We believe that among instances
of two party competition our analysis is best suited for parliamentary systems. In these systems,
a party with a majority in parliament can exercise eﬀective control of parliamentary procedure in
order to implement a relatively unconstrained policy agenda. On the other hand, our theory would
require modiﬁcations in order to be applicable for a Congressional such as that prevailing in the
US, where policy choices arise as complex compromises among multiple institutional actors.
Recent reviews of the literature on two party/candidate competition appear in Duggan, 2004,
and Grofman, 2004. Partisan models of two-candidate competition under complete information
include those of Aldrich, 1983, and John Roemer 1999, 2000. In Aldrich, 1983, policy divergence
is due to party activism and voter alienation. Roemer proposes a model of party competition in
multiple issue dimensions that is premised on the idea that disagreement within parties generates
party competition equilibria when none of the parties can unanimously improve on their own
platform given the platform of the opposition. This model produces a range of equilibria, that
subsume the predictions of the models of Downs or Wittman.
Static models of two-candidate competition in which one of the candidates has an exogenous
advantage include Groseclose, 2001, and Aragones and Palfrey, 2005. Alesina, 1988, and Duggan
and Fey, 2004, study repeated versions of the models in which candidates have policy and oﬃce
motivations, respectively, and the electorate can devise complex, history dependent strategies. They
characterize the set of subgame perfect equilibria which are consistent with a wide range of policy
platforms for the parties in Alesina, 1988, and include all possible equilibrium policy outcomes
in Duggan and Fey, 2004. Gul, Dixit, and Grossman, 2000, use the same equilibrium concept
characterizing eﬃcient equilibria in a model in which parties’ re-election probabilities follow an
exogenous Markov process that depends on the incumbent’s policy choice.
Unlike our study, all of the above models assume complete information. Related studies with
incomplete information include those by Banks and Sundaram, 1993, Duggan, 2000, Banks and
Duggan, 2002, and Bernhardt, Dubey, and Hughson, 2004.8 These models apply to situations with
individual candidacies, where challengers to the incumbent are drawn from an identical pool of
8Other models of incomplete information focus on the fact that the incumbent’s action while in
oﬃce is unobserved (hidden action). Such models include Ferejohn, 1986, Rogoﬀ and Sibert, 1988,
Rogoﬀ, 1990, and Meirowitz, 2003. Banks and Sundaram, 1993, combine aspects of both models.
7possible candidates over time. As we have discussed, the assumption of challengers drawn from
a stationary distribution seems inappropriate for partisan candidacies because of inertia in party
organizations. In our analysis, beliefs about the incumbent party’s opposition in each period are
inﬂuenced by past behavior of that opposition party.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the model.
We analyze this model in sections 3 and 4. Section 4 contains the main results of the paper
concerning situations in which parties value oﬃce signiﬁcantly compared to policy. We characterize
an equilibrium (proposition 3), discuss equilibrium properties (proposition 4), and equilibrium
dynamics (proposition 5). In section 5 we extend our analysis to the case the electoral outcome is
not deterministic. We conclude in section 6.
2. MODEL
The game is played between the electorate represented by a moderate or median voter, M,
and a set of partisan ‘types’ within each of two political parties. These players interact an inﬁnity
of periods t =1 ,2,.... We denote a generic party by P, which is either a left-wing party (P = L),
or a right-wing party, (P = R). We also use −P to denote the party in opposition of party P.
Each of the two parties contains individuals with two diﬀerent ideological convictions, call
them moderates and extremists. These two groups/types disagree as to the optimal government
policy. In each period one of the two groups holds the prevailing ideological position of the party.
Thus, in period t party P ∈ {L,R} is either an extreme type, e,o ram o d e r a t et y p e ,m.W ed e n o t e
party P’s type in period t by τt
P with τt
P ∈ {e,m}.
We assume that following elections an internal shake up occurs within the losing party that
may upset the balance of power between extremists and moderates within that party. Depending
on the outcome of this internal battle, the type of the losing party may become moderate or
extreme with positive probability. We assume the prevailing type within the party is determined
probabilistically because of factors no group within the party can have full control over (e.g. the
availability of suﬃcient number of competent members in positions of inﬂuence such as MPs, MP
candidates, in local and national party organizations, unions, etc., as well as the existence of
competent leadership for each of the two ideological groups within the party).
The only assumption we make regarding this process of party type determination (inequality
(1) below), is that the new partisan type is extreme (moderate) with higher probability if the
8party was controlled by extremists (moderates) in the previous period. This serial correlation is
due to inertia in the manner in which partisan populations evolve, or due to the fact that the
prevailing ideological group in the party commands resources and/or other institutional advantages
that render it better positioned to ﬁght the internal battle for control of the party in the next
period.
Formally, we assume that if the party loses the election in period t when its type is τ ∈ {e,m},
i ti so ft h es a m et y p ei np e r i o dt+1, with probability πτ, τ ∈ {e,m}. These transition probabilities
satisfy
1 > πe > 1 − πm > 0,( 1 )
so that the probability of an extreme party type is higher if the party’s type in the previous period
is extreme. On the other hand, if the party wins the election, then its type remains unaltered
between periods. Parties know the realization of their own type in each period, but that information
is not revealed to other players except via policy consequential choices of the party/type while in
government.
Beliefs/Party Reputations Players hold (and rationally update) beliefs about the prob-
ability that each party is moderate or extreme. We can think of, and will refer to, these beliefs as
the reputation of each party regarding its moderation. In particular, in each period there is a pair
of probabilities b =( bL,b R) ∈ B,w h e r eB ≡ [0,1]
2, that represent the common beliefs of the voter
about the two parties and of the parties for each other.9 Thus, probability bL represents the belief
of M,( a n dp a r t yR)t h a tp a r t yL is extreme. Similarly, bR is the corresponding belief that party
R is extreme.
Timeline of the Game Each period in the game is a complete political cycle. A period
starts with elections, in which the voter, M, chooses one of the two parties to control the govern-
ment. Following the election, the party that ended up in the opposition undergoes a reorganization
that may result in a change in its type (extreme or moderate). The party/type in government
9Note that parties know the beliefs of the electorate regarding the extremism of the two parties.
If players know the initial priors of the electorate at the beginning of the game, they can trace the
posterior beliefs of the electorate in each period, because the information via which these beliefs
are updated is publicly available. Alternatively, we can assume parties acquire such knowledge of
the electorates’ beliefs directly in each period via polling and similar devices.
9chooses and implements a policy xt ∈ X.10
In general, there are four possible polici e si ne a c hp e r i o d ,al e f t - w i n gp o l i c y ,xL
e ,am o d e r a t e
left-wing policy, xL
m, and corresponding right-wing policies xR
e and xR
m. As will become evident by
our assumptions on players’ payoﬀs, we do not preclude the possibility that xL
m = xR
m is a common
policy. This permits a ‘convergence to the median’ equilibrium to occur. But we allow xL
m 6= xR
m,
i.e., there may exist residual partisanship even if the moderates are the prevailing group within









[insert ﬁgure 1 here]
With regard to the choice of government policies, we assume (naturally) that moderate types
always implement the moderate policy xP
m.11 The strategic burden in the model is borne by the
extreme partisan types. In particular, extreme types (τt
P = e) may choose either an extreme policy,
xP
e , revealing their type, or a moderate policy, xP
m, imitating moderate types.
The policy choice by the governing party is observed by all players and the game moves to
the next period. In that period, the voter elects a new government, new partisan types are realized,
the governing party implements a policy, etc. The timeline of the game is represented graphically
in ﬁgure 1.
Preferences Since moderate partisan types always pursue the same action, we only need
state payoﬀs for the voter and the two extreme partisan types (left and right). The preferences of
10The exact sequencing of the incumbent government’s policy choice and the realization of the
opposition party’s new prevailing type is not essential for the analysis as long as both occur prior
to the following election. Empirically, parties that lose the election undergo a period of internal
restructuring that may alter the balance of power within the party at the beginning of the interelec-
tion period. On the other hand, partisans typically exercise restrain and refrain (or are compelled
to do so) from such internal ﬁghts closer to new elections or while the party is in power.
11This is the behavior that would arise endogenously in an equilibrium of the type we characterize.


























e , i.e., the voter prefers moderate policies and parties are





e , P ∈ {L,R}.
The above preferences coincide with the intuitive interpretation of the diﬀerent types: ex-
tremists of each party prefer the respective partisan policy most, moderate policies next, and they





τ , τ ∈ {e,m}. A graphic rendition of admissible conﬁgurations of policies in
the classical one-dimensional spatial model is given in ﬁgure 2.
[insert ﬁgure 2 about here]
While the voter only cares about the policy outcome, parties also prefer to control the govern-
ment independent of the policy that the government pursues. In particular, partisan types receive
utility G ≥ 0 when their party (i.e., independent of prevailing party type) is in government. We
assume that the voter is strategic but cares only about the policy outcome in the current period.
Partisan types are (potentially) more farsighted and care about the electoral and policy outcome
in two periods, the current period t as well as period t+1. The weight parties place in the outcome
of the next period is given by a discount factor δ ∈ [0,1].
Party Strategies We shall focus our attention on Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibria in
strategies that are appropriately Markovian, i.e., strategies that depend only on a summary of the
history of the game in each period. Given the structure of the model, the payoﬀ relevant strategic
environment for the parties is summarized by the electorates’ beliefs about the probability that
extremists control the two parties, b ∈ B. In other words, from the perspective of a player about
to choose an action in period t, the payoﬀ relevant information is the current reputation of the two
11parties given by beliefs b ∈ B, even if these beliefs may have been reached from diﬀerent histories.12
Thus, a strategy for type e of party P i sg i v e nb yaf u n c t i o n :
σP : B −→ [0,1], P ∈ {L,R}.( 2 )
Accordingly, σP (b) is the probability that extreme type, e,o fp a r t yP implements policy xP
e when
party reputations are given by b ∈ B.
In principle, we could similarly restrict the voter, M, to pursue a Markovian strategy that
depends only on party reputations b ∈ B. Instead, we allow the voter’s strategy to also depend on
the policy choice of the party in government in the period prior to the election.13 This allows us
to build a retrospective element on voter’s strategies, even though the voter is still prospective and
strategic. Furthermore, this type of history dependence ensures the existence of equilibrium, which
is not in general guaranteed in this class of stochastic games.
Thus, a voter strategy is given by a function














∈ (0,1) means the voter random-
izes accordingly.
Evolving Reputations In order to update their beliefs regarding the extremism of the
two parties, players use all the information accumulated between two consecutive elections. This
information includes both the identity of the party in opposition, as well as the policy pursued by
the government.
Speciﬁcally, players use Bayes’ rule to update beliefs about the incumbent party after ob-
serving its policy choice. They also use their knowledge of the structure of the game in order to
update beliefs regarding the opposition party’s type, which is drawn by nature according to the
probabilities in (1). We emphasize that both of these pieces of information (the government’s policy
choice and the identity of the party in opposition) are publicly observable.
12For a dynamic game in which players’ Markov strategies are conditioned on beliefs in a similar
fashion, see Mailath and Samuelson, 2001.
13This is in addition to the indirect eﬀect that these policies have on the voter’s beliefs. In other
words, the voter may choose a diﬀerent voting action following two diﬀerent policies, even if these
two policies lead to the same posterior beliefs.
12Thus, the updated beliefs of voter M in period t+1with beliefs in period t given by (bL,b R) ∈
B are represented by a function β : B×{L,R}×X −→ B. The coordinate of β that corresponds to
the updated belief about the incumbent party P after it implemented a policy x ∈ X is obtained





1 if x = xP
e
(1−σP(b))bP
1−σP(b)bP if x = xP
m, σP (b)bP < 1
, P ∈ {L,R}.( 4 )
Recall that σP (b) is the probability (to be determined endogenously in equilibrium) that an extreme
type of party P chooses an extreme policy, xP
e , when in government, with party −P in opposition.
Eﬀectively, we assume a (standard) reﬁnement on beliefs by assuming the electorate be-






=1 ) even if such a policy has zero probability in equilibrium (σP (b)=0 ). Sim-
ilarly, we complete (4) in the out of equilibrium event that a moderate policy is observed when











= bP if σP (b)=0 , i.e., there is nothing learned about the govern-
ing party if both extreme and moderate types choose moderate policies with probability one. In
this case (when σP (b)=0 ) the updated reputation about the governing party is identical to that
this party attained prior to implementing a government policy.
[insert ﬁgure 3 about here]
The reputation of the opposition party changes because the electoral loss triggers an internal
shake up in the party that may alter the status quo within that party. Thus, the coordinate of β
that corresponds to the opposition party P is given by:
βP (b,P,x)=πebP +( 1− πm)(1− bP), P ∈ {L,R}.( 5 )
T h e r ei sal e v e lo fb e l i e fa b o u tt h ee x t r e m i t yo ft h eo pposition party, at which that party’s reputation
remains unchanged between periods. Since this level is important in our ensuing discussion, we




2 − πe − πm
.( 6 )
It is straightforward to verify using assumption (1) that
bP > βP ((b−P,b P),P,x) ⇐⇒ βP ((b−P,b P),P,x) >b o ⇐⇒ bP >b o (7)
13i.e., a party with a perceived extremism above (below) the long-term steady state is moving
monotonically toward that steady state from either direction. In ﬁgure 3 we depict the changes in
the reputation of the opposition party following an election. Note that the direction and magnitude
of change of beliefs regarding the party’s extremism diﬀer with the direction and distance of beliefs
at the time of the election from the steady state reputation level bo.
Equilibrium Concept As we have already discussed in deﬁning players’ strategies, the
equilibrium concept we use is a semi-Markov version of Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium. We
provide a formal deﬁnition of the equilibrium in the appendix. In the remainder, we explain certain
reﬁnements of this concept that we apply in our analysis.
First, the history dependence of voting strategies allows us to incorporate a retrospective
element on voting behavior, in accordance with prevalent claims regarding retrospective voting
behavior in the empirical literature. In particular, we say that a voting strategy is retrospective
if the voter does not re-elect a party that pursued an extreme policy while in government in the












1 if P = R
0 if P = L
,f o ra l lb ∈ B.( 8 )
Since parties only care about one future period, a retrospective voting strategy gives parties
a strong incentive to pursue moderate policies. Thus, equilibria in which parties pursue extreme
policies are signiﬁcantly more credible when they are retrospective equilibria. We emphasize that
we do not assume retrospective voting as a “hard-wired” behavioral trait of the electorate. In other
words, retrospective voting constitutes a best response if present in a retrospective equilibrium.
Our equilibrium deﬁnition leaves room for a further reﬁnement on voting strategies. To
motivate this reﬁnement, note that in general the voter is allowed to randomize in arbitrary fashion
in the elections when indiﬀerent between the two parties. This is not controversial in our symmetric
setup if the reputation of the two parties is identical. But if the beliefs about the two parties diverge,
it seems intuitive that the voter may favor the party that is perceived to be more moderate.
This intuition becomes obvious if we consider the case both parties are expected to pursue
a moderate policy with probability one following elections. In that case, the voter is indiﬀerent
between the two parties. But this indiﬀerence is not robust to the possibility of a (small) exogenous
probability ε > 0 that extreme types may ‘tremble’ and choose an extreme policy, contrary to the
14prescribed equilibrium strategy. Clearly, if such trembles are possible, the voter strictly prefers that
between the two parties that is perceived less extreme.
Informally, a robust equilibrium is one in which the voter’s strategy is a best response even
if extreme party types may ‘tremble’ away from their equilibrium strategy choice with a small
probability ε.W ed e ﬁne robust equilibria formally in the appendix. There exists an obvious con-
nection between our requirement and standard reﬁnement arguments dating to Selten’s trembling
hand perfect notion. It is important to emphasize that the concepts are also diﬀerent. First, we
consider one among a (very) large range of possible trembles of partisan strategies. Furthermore,
we do not consider the consequences of such trembles on the optimality or robustness of parties’
strategies, even though that is an obvious avenue to pursue. Our goal with a robust equilibrium
is more limited in that we simply seek to resolve the electorate’s possible indiﬀerence in a manner
that is responsive to its beliefs about the relative extremism of the two parties.
There is a more direct (and apparently more restrictive) manner to impose such a reﬁnement.
In particular, it seems intuitive in our setup to conjecture that parties are weakly p r e f e r r e db yt h e
voter when they are perceived to be less extreme than the opposition. Thus, if we require this
intuitive property and resolve indiﬀerence in favor of the least extreme party, we may deﬁne an





1 if bL <b R
0 if bL >b R
(9)
for all x ∈ X.
Note that, because of assumption (1), condition (8) is implied by condition (9). In other
words, an intuitive equilibrium must be retrospective because the posterior belief following an
extreme policy, xP











we will use the somewhat redundant combined term referring to an equilibrium as an intuitive
retrospective equilibrium if the voter’s strategy satisﬁes (9) (and (8)).14
In the next two sections we proceed to an analysis of the game. First we consider the
analogues of ‘pooling’ and ‘separating’ equilibria in our dynamic game. In such equilibria, extreme
14A second remark is that, in eﬀect, condition (9) renders the surviving equilibria closer to genuine
Markov Perfect equilibria. In particular, the voter is limited to (possibly) condition her action on
past policy choices only in a set of payoﬀ relevant states b ∈ B such that bL = bR. Thus, an intuitive
equilibrium involves voting strategies that are Markovian, except for a set of payoﬀ relevant states
b ∈ B of measure zero.
15partisan types pursue the same policy (moderate or extreme, respectively) independent of party
reputations b ∈ B, hence we call these equilibria simple. Our main results appear in section 4,
w h e r ew ec o n s i d e rr o b u s tr e t r o s p e c t i v ee q u i l i b r i at hat are not simple and involve parties that place
high weight in oﬃce (high G) and in the future (high δ).
3. SIMPLE EQUILIBRIA
Naturally, the primary focus of our analysis is in the dynamics induced by the strategic
calculus of extreme partisan types when they contemplate the trade-oﬀ between a (preferable)
extreme policy in the current period and the possible utility loss in the next period due to averse
electoral consequences from this extreme policy choice. In particular, we are interested in the
range of possible combinations of party reputations (i.e., beliefs held by the electorate about the
extremism of these parties) for which the extreme partisan types pursue extreme policies (if at all),
and the policy dynamics these strategies generate.
Before we move to this more interesting analysis, we consider two simple types of equilibria
in which parties’ strategy does not depend on party reputations b ∈ B. First, in proposition 1,
we give a precise range of parameters in which extreme partisan types implement extreme policies
whenever in power, independent of party reputations b ∈ B.W eh a v e :
Proposition 1 An equilibrium in which extreme partisan types pursue an extreme policy with











All such equilibria are robust, intuitive, and retrospective. If the inequality (10) is strict then all
equilibria must involve such party strategies.
Note that (except for the case of equality) when condition (10) holds all equilibria of the
game involve extreme partisan types pursuing their ideal policy, independent of the electorates’
beliefs. Thus retrospective voting is not suﬃcient to induce moderation when either (a) parties are
impatient (low δ), or (b) parties place low value to oﬃce (low G), or (c) the loss in utility due to
the policies pursued by the opposition party controlling the government is small (low uP
e − aP
e ),
or (d) when the ability of extremists to maintain control of the party following electoral defeat is
small (low πe).
16One may conjecture that when these conditions are reversed we may instead obtain a simple
‘pooling’ equilibrium in which extreme partisan types always imitate the moderate partisan types
by pursuing a moderate policy. It is possible to construct such equilibria (for high enough G & δ)
exploiting voters’ indiﬀerence, but these equilibria are not robust. Indeed we can show that there
does not exist a robust ‘pooling’ equilibrium:
Proposition 2 There does not exist a robust equilibrium such that all governments pursue mod-
erate policies with probability one, independent of party reputations, b ∈ B.
Thus the analogue to a ‘convergence to the median’ result is not attainable in our game
in a robust equilibrium, even with retrospective voting. The reasoning behind proposition 2 is
straightforward. If all party types moderate policies independent of the electorate’s beliefs, then
the electorate is indiﬀerent between the two parties. In a robust equilibrium, the voters then will
elect that between the two parties that is (strictly) perceived to be more moderate. Thus, a party
that is in government, is controlled by extremists, and is perceived to be more extreme than the
opposition even when implementing a moderate policy, has no incentive to pursue such a moderate
policy. This party faces electoral defeat independent of policy choice, so types in control of the party
might as well pursue their ideal policy.
Thus, in combination, propositions 1 and 2 imply that when condition (10) fails, a robust
retrospective equilibrium must involve some positive probability of moderate policies pursued by
extreme types who anticipate a future electoral gain from doing so, as well as some positive prob-
ability of extreme policies pursued by these types. We take the analysis of such more interesting
equilibria in the next section.
4. EQUILIBRIUM WITH OFFICE MOTIVATED PARTIES
Proposition 1 demonstrates that the strategic calculus of parties is trivial when partisans
are primarily motivated by policy. Such parties/types simply pursue their ideal policy. Thus, the
interesting strategic environment is one in which parties value oﬃce signiﬁcantly compared to policy
(high G)a n da r ep a t i e n t( h i g hδ). Three questions emerge in such an environment: (a) Does there
exist a robust retrospective equilibrium in which extreme party types pursue extreme policies (if
elected) for some beliefs? (b) Are extreme policies observed along the equilibrium path?, and (c)
what are the policy and electoral dynamics that prevail? In what follows, we answer question (a),
17(b), and (c) in subsections 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 respectively.
4.1 Equilibrium
Our goal in this section is to establish an equilibrium when condition (10) fails, and parties
are suﬃciently patient and motivated predominantly by oﬃce considerations (high G). Proposition










There exists a unique15 intuitive retrospective equilibrium in which the probability of an extreme





bP − πeb−P − (1 − πm)(1− b−P)
bP (1 − πeb−P − (1 − πm)(1− b−P))
if bP > πeb−P +( 1− πm)(1− b−P),
0 otherwise.
(12)
This equilibrium is robust.




τ , P ∈ {L,R}, τ ∈ {e,m}. Furthermore, the equilibrium in proposition 3 holds
for arbitrarily large values of G, as long as parties place some weight in the future (δ > 0).
Thus, no matter how oﬃce oriented parties are, there exists a conﬁguration of beliefs by the
electorate about the extremism of the two parties that makes it worthwhile for extreme partisan
types to pursue extreme policies when in government. As we explain shortly, this occurs when the
party is disadvantaged electorally. Figures 4(i) display the equilibrium probability of an extreme
policy choice by extreme partisans of party L, σL (b),f o rd i ﬀerent values of the parameters πe, πm.
[insert ﬁgure 4 here]
From the perspective of the electorate, the expected probability that, say, party L will pursue
an extreme policy given beliefs b ∈ B,i sg i v e nb ybLσL (b).I nﬁgures 4(ii) we plot this probability.
In both cases of ﬁgures 4(i) and 4(ii) it is straightforward to verify via calculus or visual inspection
that the probability of an extreme policy increases as the party is perceived to be more extreme.
15In particular, the equilibrium uniquely determines the value of the voting strategy, Φ,e x c e p t
for Φ(x,b,b), b<1−πm or b>πe. Due to (5), these beliefs cannot be reached along the path of play.
18Furthermore, the party must be perceived relatively more extreme than it’s opposition in order for
it to pursue extreme policies.














, becomes obvious if we consider
the electoral prospects of this party by following either an extreme or a moderate policy with






, the party loses the
election in an intuitive equilibrium if it pursues a moderate policy with probability one. This is
because in that case (if σL (b) is equal to zero), the policy of the government conveys no information
to the electorate and other players in the game regarding the government’s type. Thus, following










, and party L loses the election despite its attempt to appear moderate. Thus,
pursuing a moderate policy with probability one is not an equilibrium.
Similarly, it is not an equilibrium for extremists of party L to implement an extreme policy
with probability one (σL (b)=1 ). If σL (b)=1 , the electorate expect diﬀerent party types to reveal
their true preferences. Thence, extremists have an incentive to deviate and implement a moderate
policy instead, in order to carry the upcoming election. Such a deviation convinces the voter that
the party is moderate, when in fact it is extreme. Thus, the only possibility for an equilibrium is
a mixed strategy, where the mixture probability is such that it makes the party barely competitive
against its opponent at the elections when the realization of the party’s randomization is a moderate
policy.
Finally, when the party has an electoral advantage (bt
L < πebt





)i th a s
no incentive to spoil its electoral prospects by implementing an extreme policy. In particular, the
party wins the election whenever it sets a moderate policy. Thus, given that partisan types care
suﬃciently about oﬃce, the only equilibrium choice is to set σL (b)=0 , i.e., extreme types of
party L choose a moderate policy with probability one.
4.2 Extreme Policies Along the Equilibrium Path
The fact that extreme partisan types pursue their ideal policy with positive probability
(σP (b) > 0)f o rs o m eb e l i e f sb ∈ B in proposition 3 is not, in general, suﬃcient to produce
extreme policies along the equilibrium path. This is because these types pursue extreme policies
only when their party is perceived (relatively) more extreme. But, parties that are perceived more
19extreme are not elected in government in the ﬁrst place. In other words, along the equilibrium path,
the probability that an extreme policy is observed is regulated via appropriate screening from the
electorate.
Do we obtain extreme policies along the equilibrium path despite this selection eﬀect of
elections? The answer is in the aﬃrmative and our analysis provides a precise mechanism for this
to occur. Extreme policies are observed in equilibrium following elections in which: (a) both parties
are perceived to be extreme (above the steady state level of extremism, bo), and (b) the election
is ‘close’. Speciﬁcally, the set of party reputations for which extreme policies are expected with
positive probability is deﬁned as follows:
e B ≡ {b ∈ B : bL > πebR +( 1− πm)(1− bR) & bR > πebL +( 1− πm)(1− bL)}.( 1 3 )
This set of beliefs for which extreme policies are possible in equilibrium is depicted graphically
in ﬁgures 4(iii) for diﬀerent values of the transition probabilities πe and πm. It is straightforward
to verify from assumption (1) that this set is is not empty, and that reputations (bL,b R) in set e B
are such that both parties are above the steady state level of extremism, i.e., bL,b R >b o.
Extreme policies occur in this area of the space of possible party reputations due to a ‘regres-
sion to the mean’ eﬀect on these reputations. Parties that are perceived relatively more extreme
and barely lose the election to the opposition undergo internal changes, or reforms following their
electoral defeat. Because these parties’ perceived extremism is above their steady state level (6),
this internal shake up moves the party towards moderation closer to its long term perceived ex-
tremism (by condition (7)). As a result, a government that comes to power with a bare advantage,
is bound to be perceived more extreme than the opposition immediately following the election. In
these cases the government may pursue extreme policies.
We summarize our discussion of the equilibrium in the following proposition:16
Proposition 4 The equilibrium in proposition 3 is such that:
(a) The (expected) probability that party L implements an extreme policy following victory in an
election with party reputations b ∈ B, weakly increases with bL, and weakly decreases with bR,
(b) The expected probability of an extreme policy following an election with party reputations
b ∈ B,i sw e a k l yi n c r e a s i n gw i t hbL when bL <b R, and is weakly decreasing with bL when
bL >b R,a n d
16The proof of this and the following proposition are straightforward and are omitted.
20(c) The expected probability of an extreme policy following an election with party reputations
b ∈ B is positive if and only if b ∈ e B.
We conclude our analysis in this section by considering the dynamics of beliefs and policies
induced by the equilibrium in proposition 3.
4.3 Equilibrium Dynamics
Starting from any initial party reputations b ∈ B, beliefs evolve over time via Bayes’ rule
following government’s policy, and via the electorate’s anticipation of internal restructuring within
parties that lose the election. It is straightforward to verify that equilibrium beliefs remain un-
changed if for some reason the system rests at belief points (bL,b o) ∈ B with bL ≤ bo and party
L is in government.17 In these cases the party in government is pursuing a moderate policy with
probability one, and there are no changes in beliefs regarding the opposition because the opposition
is already at its steady state level of beliefs, bo.
Indeed, the equilibrium in proposition 3 is such that party reputations converge with proba-
bility one in the long-run to some level (bP,b o) with bP ≤ bo, for one of the two parties P, without
any (endogenous) forces inducing a change in beliefs ever after. At all these possible long-run party
reputation levels, there is probability zero of an extreme policy. But, both the eventual long-term
beliefs and the path that leads to these beliefs diﬀer qualitatively depending on initial conditions.
We summarize these dynamics in proposition 5, and elaborate on these points in the remainder
of this subsection:
Proposition 5 The equilibrium in proposition 3 is such that when initial party reputations are
b =(bL,b R) ∈ B:
(a) If bP ≤ bo for some P ∈ {L,R} there is zero probability of an extreme policy along the path
of play and, in the long-run, equilibrium party reputations converge to (bL,b o) if bL <b R,t o
(bo,b R) if bL >b R,a n dt oe i t h e r(bL,b o) or (bo,b R) if bR = bL,
(b) If bL,b R >b o equilibrium party reputations converge to (bo,b o) ∈ B in the long-run, and for
any period t t h e r ei sp o s i t i v ep r o b a b i l i t yo fa ne x t r e m ep o l i c yi ns o m ef u t u r ep e r i o dt0 >t , i.e.,
beliefs in the set e B emerge inﬁnitely often along the path of play.
17Or, symmetrically if (b
o,b R) ∈ B with bR ≤ b
o and party R in government.
21Independent of initial party reputations, one of the two parties may enjoy a signiﬁcant elec-
toral advantage in multiple successive elections.
The dynamics described in proposition 5 are illustrated graphically in ﬁgure 5. Following
any election with beliefs satisfying the condition of case (a) of the proposition, the party that is
elected in government is guaranteed to be perceived more moderate than the opposition. As a
result, the government always implements a moderate policy and is re-elected with probability one.
This process continues until players’ beliefs about the extremism of the opposition party reach the
steady state level bo given by (6).
[insert ﬁgure 5 about here]
The situation is much diﬀerent when both parties are perceived to be above their long-term
steady state level of extremism, bo. In these cases, we have one of two possibilities. Either the
party in government is relatively more extreme than the opposition in which case it implements an
extreme policy with positive probability; or, the party is favored electorally and pursues a moderate
policy. In the latter case, the governing party wins re-election until internal adjustments in the
opposition ‘turn the tide,’ and the opposition is perceived more moderate than the government.
Since both beliefs bL,b R exceed the long-term steady state level of perceived extremism bo,
such a situation will arise ‘inﬁnitely often’ along the equilibrium path due to condition (7).18 By
that we mean that for any period in the game there is probability one of a future period in which
party reputations belong in the set e B. As a consequence, if the system starts from a situation in
which both parties are perceived to be relatively extreme, extreme policies will occur in the future
with strictly positive probability for every period along the path of adjustment to the long term
equilibrium party reputations (bo,b o) ∈ B.
Importantly, the path to the long-run steady state may be quite long when bL,b R >b o,
depending on the values of transition probabilities πe, πm. Thus, even though in the long run the
political system converges to a situation consistent with the predictions of Downsian competition,
equilibrium adjustment dynamics may contain a signiﬁcant number of electoral cycles away from
that long-term steady state and with a positive expectation of extremism.19




19In a special case, this adjustment process is immediate. This occurs when the probability that
22[insert table 2 here]
Last, but not least, the equilibrium dynamics in either case (a) or (b) of proposition 5 imply
that one of the two parties may enjoy an electoral advantage in successive elections. To corroborate
that claim, we report calculations of equilibrium probabilities of the possible outcomes (victorious
party and government policy) in a sequence of 20 electoral cycles in table 2, for certain initial
conditions and parameter values.
As is immediate from table 2, the implied pattern for the sequencing of electoral victories for
the two parties from these calculated probabilities is highly consistent with the observed data in
parliamentary systems in which two parties alternate in power, such as New Zealand or the UK.
In these systems, as evident from the data in table 1, one of the two parties has enjoyed electoral
success for 3, or 4 consecutive elections for time periods spanning well over a decade. On the
contrary, static theories of two party competition produce equilibrium predictions that consistently
project the same probability of victory for one of the two contesting parties in equilibrium.
5. PROBABILISTIC ELECTIONS
The model in the previous section constitutes a clean, baseline environment from which to
evaluate the consequences of introducing more complicated assumptions. In this section we consider
one such extension, namely the possibility of probabilistic elections.
Even for the most tame political environments it is reasonable to assume that events out of
the control of the players may inﬂuence the outcome of the electoral campaign and give a critical
electoral advantage to one of the two parties contesting for power. Such exogenous events can
be both favorable to the government (e.g. a victorious war or success in foreign policy) or the
opposition, (e.g. scandal involving the government, etc.). They may simply represent a temporary
swing on the electorate’s ideological convictions.
To incorporate this possibility, we assume that in each election period there is an (exogenous)
probability, w, that the incumbent government is re-elected or ousted, independent of the voter’s
a party is extreme following an internal shake-up is independent of the previous identity of the
prevailing group in the party, i.e. when b
o = πe =1−πm. This case corresponds to the assumption in
existing electoral models with incomplete information (e.g. Banks and Sundaram, 1993, or Banks
and Duggan, 2002). In these models, extremism (or quality) is not serially correlated over time,
and equilibrium is stationary along the equilibrium path.
23strategy. In eﬀect, this amounts to restricting the voter’s strategy to:
Φ : X ×B−→ [w,1 − w], 0 <w<1
2,( 1 4 )
with the obvious modiﬁcations on conditions (8) and (9).20
Of course, with this assumption a party that is perceived relatively more extreme is no
longer guaranteed defeat in elections. This has two main implications for our analysis. First,
substantively we obtain equilibrium outcomes that are closer to empirical observation. Just like
Margaret Thatcher’s Conservatives won reelections in 1983, there is positive probability that a
party may remain in government and implement an extreme policy in successive periods in our
analysis.
The second implication of our assumption on the probabilistic nature of elections has to do
with equilibrium dynamics. In particular, it is straightforward to derive the following extension of
propositions 3 and 5:21
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(a) There exists a unique intuitive, retrospective equilibrium with partisan strategies given by (12).
This equilibrium is robust.
(b) The expected probability of an extreme policy following an election with party reputations
b ∈ B, is positive independent of the identity of the victorious party if and only if b ∈ e B,
(c) For initial party reputations bL,b R >b o, beliefs in e B occur inﬁnitely often along the equilibrium
path,
(d) For initial party reputations with bP ≤ bo for some P ∈ {L,R}, beliefs in e B never occur in
equilibrium,
(e) For any initial party reputations b ∈ B, equilibrium party reputations converge to (bo,b o) ∈ B
in the long-run.
20A slightly more complicated assumption in the same spirit is to assume w is an appropriate
function of the electorate’s beliefs b ∈ B. This can be implemented in the analysis to follow, without
any gain in insight.
21The proof is available upon request.
24Condition (15) is analogous to condition (11), adjusting for the probabilistic nature of elec-
tions. This is a suﬃcient (not necessary) condition that is satisﬁed for large enough G, i.e., if
parties are suﬃciently oﬃce oriented.
Qualitatively, the equilibrium in proposition 6 is very similar to that in proposition 3. In
particular, the strategies of extreme party types are identical, and equilibrium dynamics display
similar properties. When the belief about the extremity of at least one of the two parties is less
than or equal to bo, then extreme policies are observed only when, contrary to the systematic22
preference of the median voter (with probability w), a relatively moderate party loses the election.
Furthermore, along the path of adjustment at least one of the two parties is always perceived to be
extreme with probability less than bo.
On the other hand, if the reputation level of both parties exceeds the long-term level bo there
is positive probability of extreme policies by both contestants in the election along the equilibrium
path of adjustment. In other words, for beliefs that are visited inﬁnitely often along the equilibrium
path there are elections in which the winner implements extreme policies with positive probability,
whether the winner is the relatively moderate party or not. Thus, it is still the case that the path
of adjustment for initial party reputations bL,b R >b o produces more policy extremism than is the
case when either bL ≤ bo or bR ≤ bo.
The main diﬀerence of the adjustment dynamics in proposition 6 compared to proposition
3, is that with probabilistic voting the party reputations at which the political system converges
to in the long-run do not depend on initial conditions. In particular, equilibrium beliefs eventually
converge to (bo,b o) ∈ B from any initial level b ∈ B.
6. CONCLUSIONS
Stylized models of two candidate competition assume the contenders for oﬃce make truthful
policy promises which voters take at face value. In this study, we have departed from these models
to propose a reputation based theory of two-party competition. We have assumed that political
parties enter the electoral arena with a(n endogenously formed) reputation regarding the prevailing
policy preferences within the party. Instead of campaign promises, these party reputations shape
the electorate’s expectations about the policies that are likely to be pursued by the victorious party
22i.e., when exogenous shocks in preferences such as scandals, foreign policy developments, etc.
alter the median’s ranking between the two contesting parties.
25following elections. The second basic premise of our analysis is that party reputations improve or
deteriorate gradually following electoral defeat, due to inertia within party organizations.
From these two simple premises, we have built a dynamic model of two party competition in
which government actions are dependent not only on the incumbent party’s reputation among the
electorate, but also on the opposition party’s reputation. These choices shape future reputation
levels as well as future policy and electoral outcomes. We showed that in robust equilibria in
which parties care suﬃciently about oﬃce, the ruling party pursues extreme policies when it has a
relatively worse reputation compared to the opposition. Extreme policies occur in equilibrium when
(a) both parties’ reputations are above some ﬁxed steady state level and (b) elections are close,
i.e., both parties have similar reputations. We also showed that, depending on initial conditions,
policy dynamics can be one of two types. One displays polarized politics that involve extreme
policies with positive probability along the adjustment path. The other involves moderate policies
with probability one along the adjustment path. In the long run, both parties pursue moderate
policies with probability one, independent of initial conditions. The electoral dynamics associated
with either adjustment path may involve one of the two parties enjoying an electoral advantage in
consecutive elections.
As we discussed in the introduction, these results are consistent with empirical observation in
a number of parliamentary systems in which two parties alternate in power. In particular, politics
in such systems may alternate between phases of convergence and polarization. Also, diﬀerent
countries with the same institutional setup may experience completely diﬀerent dynamics under
the same equilibrium, due to diﬀerent initial conditions. Furthermore, the electoral dynamics
produced by our model as exempliﬁed in the simulation reported in table 2 are consistent with
actual electoral results in a number of countries such as those reported in table 1.
Of course, our setup leaves a number of open avenues for improvement. First, we have
assumed a coarse policy/type space, by allowing only two policy choices and two possible party
preferences. Allowing more party types generates a much more interesting strategic environment,
since governments in our model condition their policy choice on the reputation of the opponent. As
a result, with intermediate party policy preferences possible, extreme parties may push government
policies in the preferred direction just enough in order to maintain an advantage against an oppo-
sition that has a worse reputation. This is not possible in the present study because any extreme
policy choice by the government implies that the updated reputation for the governing party must
26be worse than that of the opposition party.
Second, the equilibrium we characterize in this study when parties are primarily oﬃce mo-
tivated involves a long-run steady state level of reputations for the two parties such that both
parties pursue moderate policies with probability one. This conclusion is qualiﬁed if we introduce
additional noise in the political system in one of two forms: (a) if we assume that the preferences
of the ruling party change with positive probability while the party is in government, or (b) if we
assume random (exogenous) shocks on party reputations in any given period.
The second of the above two model modiﬁcations also allows us to introduce more generality
in our analysis. In particular, asymmetry in party and voter preferences, as well as a larger set of
possible party types and policies can be accommodated if we assume party reputations are subjected
to an exogenous random shock. This source of noise in the political system can be construed as
an alternative to our version of probabilistic elections. Under mild conditions, this alternative
guarantees existence of Markovian equilibria in the associated stochastic games. Of course, such
generality comes at the cost of the lack of analytical solutions, a very appealing feature of our
maintained setup.
27REFERENCES
1. Aldrich, J. H. 1983. “A Downsian Spatial Model with Party Activism,” American Political
Science Review, 77(4): 974-990.
2. Alesina, A. 1988. “Credibility and Policy Convergence in a Two-party System with Rational
voters,” American Economic Review. 78: 796—805.
3. Aragones, E.and T. Palfrey. 2005. “Spatial Competition Between Two Candidates of Diﬀerent
Quality: The Eﬀects of Candidate Ideology and Private Information,” in Social Choice and
Strategic Behavior: Essays in Honor of Jeﬀrey Scot Banks. D. Austen-Smith and J. Duggan
eds. Springer: Berlin.
4. Banks, Jeﬀrey and John Duggan. 2002. “A Multidimensional Model of Repeated Elections,”
mimeo.
5. Banks, Jeﬀrey and R. Sundaram. 1993. “Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection in a Model
of Repeated Elections,” in Political Economy: Institutions, Information, Competition and
Representation, W. Barnett et al. eds., New York: Cambridge University Press.
6. Bernhardt, Dan, Sangita Dubey and Eric Hughson. 2004. “Term Limits and Pork Barrel
Politics,” Journal of Public Economics, 2383-2422.
7. Calvert, R. 1985. “Robustness of the Multidimensional Voting Model: Candidate Motiva-
tions, Uncertainty, and Convergence,” American Journal of Political Science, 29: 69—95.
8. Dixit, Avinash, Gene M. Grossman, and Faruk Gul. 2000. “The Dynamics of Political
Compromise,” Journal of Political Economy, 108(3):531-68.
9. Downs, Anthony. 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. Harper Collins. New York.
N.Y.
10. Duggan, John. 2000. “Repeated Elections with Asymmetric Information”, Economics and
Politics,12: 109-136.
11. Duggan, John. 2004. “Candidate Objectives and Electoral Equilibrium” forthcoming (Oxford
Handbook of Political Economy, edited by Barry Weingast and Donald Wittman).
2812. Duggan, John and Mark Fey. 2002. “Repeated Downsian Electoral Competition,” mimeo,
University of Rochester.
13. Ferejohn, John. 1986. “Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control,” Public Choice, 50:
5—25.
14. Grofman, Bernard. 2004. “Downs and Two-Party Convergence,” Annual Review of Political
Science, 7: 25-46.
15. Groseclose, T. 2001. “A Model of Candidate Location When One Candidate Has a Valence
Advantage,” American Journal of Political Science, 45(October): 862-86. 2001.
16. Hotelling, H. 1929. “Stability in Competition,” Economic Journal, 39: 41—57.
17. Ledyard, J. 1984. “The Pure Theory of Large Two-Candidate Elections,” Public Choice, 44:
7—41.
18. Mailath, George J. and Larry Samuelson. 2001. “Who wants a Good Reputation?,” Review
of Economic Studies, 68: 415-41.
19. Meirowitz, Adam. 2003. “Accountability and representation in repeated elections with un-
certain policy constraints,” working paper, Princeton University.
20. Roemer, John. 1999. ”The Democratic Political Economy of Progressive Income Taxation,”
Econometrica, 67(1), 1-19.
21. Roemer, John. 2000. Political Competition. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
22. Rogoﬀ, Kenneth. 1990. “Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles,” American Economic Review
80(1): 21-36.
23. Rogoﬀ, Kenneth and Anne, Sibert. 1988. “Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles,”
Review of Economic Studies 55(1): 1-16.
24. Wittman, Donald. 1983. “Candidate Motivation: A Synthesis of Alternative Theories,”
American Political Science Review, 77: 142—157.
2925. Wittman, Donald. 1990. “Spatial Strategies When Candidates Have Policy Preferences,” Ad-
vances in the Spatial Theory of Voting, J. Enelow and M. Hinich, eds., New York: Cambridge
Press.
30APPENDIX
In this appendix we state the proofs of propositions 1 to 3. Before we do so, we elaborate on
some deﬁnitions that were discussed informally in the main body of the paper. Given strategies Φ,
σP, P ∈ {L,R},w eﬁrst derive expressions for players’ expected payoﬀs. The expected utility of




















m if P = R
.( 1 6 )




































































O b s e r v et h a tt h i se x p r e s s i o nr e ﬂects party L’s updated assessment in the ensuing period regarding





,a f t e rp a r t yR’s term in the opposition. The corresponding
expression for party R is obtained in an analogous fashion.
W i t ht h ea b o v ew es t a t et h ed e ﬁnition of our equilibrium concept as follows:




⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
=1 if V (b,L) >V(b,R)
∈ [0,1] if V (b,L)=V (b,R)
=0 if V (b,L) <V(b,R)




⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩




























, for all b ∈ B, P ∈ {L,R}. (19)
We deﬁne a robust equilibrium as follows:











⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
1 − ε if σP∗ (b) > 1 − ε
ε if σP∗ (b) < ε
σP∗ (b) otherwise.
(20)
We now proceed to the proofs. For ease of reference, we restate the propositions to be proven.
We start with proposition 1:











All such equilibria are robust, intuitive, and retrospective. If (10) is strict then σP (b)=1 ,f o ra l l
b ∈ B, P ∈ {L,R} in all equilibria.
Proof. We start by showing that all equilibria with σP (b)=1for all b ∈ B, P ∈ {L,R}
must be robust and intuitive (hence retrospective). For perturbed party strategies σP
ε (b)=1− ε
we calculate voter’s expected utility as








We have Vε (b,L) >V ε (b,R) ⇐⇒ bL <b R for all ε ≥ 0. Thus, an equilibrium with strategies
σP (b)=1for all b ∈ B, P ∈ {L,R} is robust and intuitive.








e we must have σP (b)=1for all b ∈ B, P ∈
{L,R} in all equilibria. Suppose, to get a contradiction, that there exists an equilibrium with








for these beliefs. Note



































e + G + δ
¡
πeaP
e +( 1− πe)aP
m
¢
, for all b ∈ B.










, for all b ∈ B. Thus, using these bounds,









e + G + δ
¡
πeaP


















e , a contradiction.
Next, we verify that σP (b)=1for all b ∈ B, P ∈ {L,R} is part of an equilibrium when
(10) holds. From the above arguments, σP (b)=1for all b ∈ B, P ∈ {L,R} are (at least weak)








e .A sar e s u l t ,w e
32only need specify a voting strategy that is a best response. We have already shown that the voting




1 if bL <b R
0 if bL >b R
. Further set arbitrary values for Φ(x,b,b),
b ∈ (0,1). W eh a v ee s t a b l i s h e dt h a tσP (b)=1for all b ∈ B, P ∈ {L,R}, is part of a robust,
retrospective, and intuitive equilibrium when (10) is true.
Lastly, we show that party strategies σP (b)=1for all b ∈ B, P ∈ {L,R} c a n n o tb ep a r t









































e for all bR > b bR. Without loss of
generality assume party L is in government. In every equilibrium with party strategies σP (b)=1




1 if bL <b R
0 if bL >b R





















, we calculate expected




















.( 2 1 )












where we have obtained (21) and (22) by substituting for Φ(x,·,·) in (17). Now, comparing the




















But the latter inequality is false for bR > b bR. As a consequence, σP (b)=1 , for all b ∈ B cannot
be a robust retrospective equilibrium when (10) is violated.
We continue with the proof of proposition 2.
Proposition 2 There does not exist a robust equilibrium such that σP (b)=0 ,f o ra l lb ∈ B, P ∈
{L,R}.
Proof. If σP (b)=0 , for all b ∈ B, P ∈ {L,R}, every robust equilibrium must be intuitive,
i.e. the voting strategy Φ(x,b) must satisfy condition (9). This is because with perturbed strategies
33σP
ε (b)=ε, voter’s expected utility is such that

















for every ε > 0.




















































m + G + δaL





e + G + δaL
m.
Thus, there exist b ∈ B such that σL (b)=0is not optimal for party L and equilibrium condition
(19) is violated.










There exists a unique intuitive retrospective equilibrium in which the probability of an extreme policy





bP − πeb−P − (1 − πm)(1− b−P)
bP (1 − πeb−P − (1 − πm)(1− b−P))
if bP > πeb−P +( 1− πm)(1− b−P),
0 otherwise.
(17)
This equilibrium is robust.
Proof. We shall prove the proposition using a few lemmas. We ﬁrst show that in a robust
equilibrium with the party strategies in (12), the voting strategy Φ must be intuitive.
Lemma 1 In a robust equilibrium with party strategies given by (12), the voting strategy satisﬁes
condition (9).



















bP(1−πeb−P−(1−πm)(1−b−P))2 < 0 if bP > πeb−P +( 1− πm)(1− b−P)
0 otherwise.
Hence, since σR (b,b)=σL (b,b) for all b ∈ [0,1],w eh a v ebL <b R =⇒ σR (b) ≥ σL (b),a n da n
intuitive voting strategy is part of a best response. To see that it is the unique best response in
a robust equilibrium, note that for the perturbed (according to (20)) strategies, σP
ε (b),w eh a v e
bL <b R =⇒ bLσL
ε (b) <b RσR
ε (b) for all ε > 0 (ε < 1
2). But
bLσL
ε (b) <b RσR
ε (b) ⇐⇒ Vε (b,L) >V ε (b,R)
where Vε (b,L), Vε (b,R) are voter’s expected utilities from electing the left and right parties
respectively given party strategies σP
ε (b). Thus, concluding the proof of the lemma, we deduce
that the only robust equilibrium must involve intuitive voting strategies that satisfy condition (9).
Next, we show using two lemmas that given intuitive retrospective voting strategy satisfying
(9), the unique equilibrium party strategies are given by (12).
Lemma 2 Assume (11) and a voting strategy that satisﬁes (9). Then σP (b)=0 , P ∈ {L,R},f o r
all b ∈ B with bP < πeb−P +( 1− πm)(1− b−P).







































































m + G + δ
¡






















































































is true and σL (b)=0is the
unique optimal strategy when (9) holds and bL < πebR +( 1− πm)(1− bR).
The last lemma is:
Lemma 3 Assume (11) and a voting strategy that satisﬁes (9). Then σP (b)=
bP−πeb−P−(1−πm)(1−b−P)
bP(1−πeb−P−(1−πm)(1−b−P)),
P ∈ {L,R},f o ra l lb ∈ B with bP ≥ πeb−P +( 1− πm)(1− b−P).
Proof. Without loss of generality we consider the strategy of party L. Following a policy xL
e




















































=0when Φ satisﬁes (9). Let σL (b)=σ;t h ep o s t e r i o r
belief following a moderate policy choice, xL













































































































































36which is true, so that it cannot be that σL (b) <
bL−πebR−(1−πm)(1−bR)
bL(1−πebR−(1−πm)(1−bR)). Similarly, if σ >
bL−πebR−(1−πm)(1−bR)







































< 0. Thus, we cannot have σ >
bL−πebR−(1−πm)(1−bR)
bL(1−πebR−(1−πm)(1−bR)) either. As a consequence, equilibrium can only be attained when σ =
σL (b)=
bL−πebR−(1−πm)(1−bR)


















To summarize, in lemmas 2 and 3 we have shown that the only equilibrium with intuitive
voting involves party strategies given by (12). Furthermore, by lemma 1, when party strategies are
given by (12) the only robust voting strategy is intuitive. Thus, there exists an essentially (except





when b/ ∈ [1 − πm,πe]) unique intuitive retrospective equilibrium that is
also robust.










are available upon request.












Opposition’s Type                        Government Policy                   Period 
Nature determines type                  Party in government                  t + 1   
of party in opposition                     determines policy 




Update of Beliefs 
Voter updates beliefs 
regarding extremism of 





Key: A period in the game is a complete political cycle that includes elections, the 
determination of government’s policy and the opposition party’s type, and the formation 
of voter’s updated beliefs regarding the extremism of the two parties. While the electorate 
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Key: The ideal policy of moderate partisans may be identical (the median) in one 
































      0            m π − 1                     b
o                                                        e π                              1 
                                                                                bL 
 
Key:                  change in beliefs following defeat of the Left 
                          change in beliefs following defeat of the RightFigure 4: Probability of Extreme Policies & Electorates’ Beliefs 
 









                        bL                                               bL                                                 bL 
(a) πe = .7, πm = .7 
 









                        bL                                               bL                                                 bL 
(b) πe = .5, πm = .7 
 









                        bL                                               bL                                                 bL 
(c) πe = .3, πm = .9 
Key: Contour plots of probability of an extreme policy in the space of beliefs, B = [0,1]
2. For 
different values of parameters πe, πm: figure (i) depicts the probability that an extreme type of 
party L would implement an extreme policy, if party L is elected; figure (ii) depicts the 
expected probability that party L implements an extreme policy, if elected; figure (iii) 
indicates the equilibrium expected probability of an extreme policy choice (by a government 
of either party) following an election with the corresponding beliefs about the extremism of 
the two parties. Darker areas indicate higher probability. Probability is zero in blanc areas. Figure 5: Equilibrium Dynamics 
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      0                                          b
o                                                                                          1 
                                                                                bL                                                                                        Case (a) 
 
Key:                  Change in beliefs following a government of the Right, 
                                      Change in beliefs following a government of the Left, 
                                      Beliefs at election, 
                                      Case (a) of Proposition 5, 
                                      Case (b) of Proposition 5, 
                                      Set B
~
 defined in (13). Table 2: Simulated Equilibrium Dynamics 
 
Government:  Party L  Party R 
Policy: 
L
e x  
L
m x  
R
m x  
R
e x  
Period 1  0.000  1.000 0.000 0.000 
Period 2  0.182  0.818 0.000 0.000 
Period 3  0.050  0.169  0.645  0.136 
Period 4  0.024  0.276  0.632  0.068 
Period 5  0.014  0.331  0.578  0.077 
Period 6  0.014  0.427  0.517  0.042 
Period 7  0.027  0.442  0.499  0.033 
Period 8  0.026  0.663 0.297 0.014 
Period 9  0.014  0.357  0.602  0.026 
Period 10  0.007  0.336  0.637  0.021 
Period 11  0.011  0.533 0.443 0.014 
Period 12  0.006  0.330  0.650  0.014 
Period 13  0.008  0.570 0.414 0.008 
Period 14  0.004  0.368  0.619  0.009 
Period 15  0.004  0.391  0.598  0.007 
Period 16  0.003  0.389  0.602  0.006 
Period 17  0.003  0.394  0.598  0.005 
Period 18  0.003  0.602 0.392 0.003 
Period 19  0.002  0.357  0.638  0.003 
Period 20  0.002  0.393  0.603  0.002 
 
Key: Table reports computed equilibrium probabilities of observing the outcome of the 
respective column in the period indicated by the corresponding row. Shaded cells indicate 
the party that wins the election with probability higher than 50% in the corresponding 
period. Calculations are based on the following parameter values: πe = .8, πm = .95,  1 =
P





m a u,   1 − =
P
e a , G = 4,  1 = δ . Initial beliefs are bL = .7, bR = .95. 








07/05/45 47.7% (61.4%) 36.8% (31.1%) 11/27/46 51.3% (52.5%) 48.4% (47.5%) 11/17/74* 13.6% (4.0%) 54.4% (73.3%)
02/23/50 46.1% (50.4%) 43.4% (47.7%) 11/30/49 47.2% (42.5%) 51.9% (57.5%) 11/20/77 25.3% (31.0%) 41.8% (57.0%)
10/25/51 48.8% (47.2%) 48.0% (51.4%) 09/01/51 45.8% (37.5%) 54.0% (62.5%) 10/18/81 48.1% (57.3%) 35.9% (38.3%)
05/26/55 46.4% (44.0%) 49.7% (54.8%) 11/13/54 44.1% (43.8%) 44.3% (56.3%) 06/02/85 45.8% (53.7%) 40.8% (42.0%)
10/08/59 43.8% (41.0%) 49.4% (57.9%) 11/30/57 48.3% (51.3%) 44.2% (48.8%) 06/18/89 39.1% (41.7%) 44.3% (48.3%)
10/15/64 44.1% (50.3%) 43.4% (48.3%) 11/26/60 43.4% (42.5%) 47.6% (57.5%) 11/05/89 40.8% (43.0%) 46.1% (49.3%)
03/31/66 48.0% (57.8%) 41.9% (40.2%) 11/30/63 43.7% (43.8%) 47.1% (56.3%) 04/08/90 38.7% (41.7%) 47.0% (50.3%)
06/18/70 43.1% (45.7%) 46.4% (52.4%) 11/26/66 41.4% (43.8%) 43.6% (55.0%) 10/10/93 46.9% (56.7%) 39.3% (37.0%)
02/28/74 37.2% (47.4%) 37.9% (46.8%) 11/29/69 44.2% (46.4%) 45.2% (53.6%) 09/22/96 41.5% (54.0%) 38.1% (36.0%)
10/10/74 39.3% (50.2%) 35.8% (43.6%) 11/25/72 48.4% (63.2%) 41.5% (36.8%) 04/09/00 43.8% (52.7%) 42.7% (41.7%)
05/03/79 36.9% (42.4%) 43.9% (53.4%) 11/29/75 39.6% (36.8%) 47.6% (63.2%) 03/07/04 40.5% (39.0%) 45.4% (55.0%)
06/09/83 27.6% (32.2%) 42.4% (61.1%) 11/25/78 40.4% (43.5%) 39.8% (55.4%)
06/11/87 30.8% (35.2%) 42.3% (57.8%) 11/28/81 39.0% (46.7%) 38.8% (51.1%)
04/09/92 34.4% (41.6%) 41.9% (51.6%) 07/14/84 43.0% (60.0%) 35.9% (37.9%)
05/01/97 43.2% (63.6%) 30.7% (25.0%) 08/15/87 48.0% (58.8%) 44.0% (41.2%)
06/07/01 41.3% (62.7%) 32.2% (25.2%) 10/27/90 35.0% (28.9%) 48.0% (70.1%)
05/05/05 35.4% (55.1%) 32.5% (30.7%) 11/06/93 34.7% (45.5%) 35.0% (50.5%)
UK New Zealand Greece
Labour Conservatives Labour National Party ΠΑΣΟΚ Νέα ∆ηµοκρατία
 
 
Key: In the bigger part of the post WWII period, the UK, New Zealand, and Greece (since 1974), have had parliamentary systems in 
which one of two parties controlled a majority in parliament. New Zealand interrupted this mode of single-party majority 
governments by adopting a more proportional electoral system since the 1996 elections, and Greece operated under a significantly 
more proportional electoral system briefly for the three elections in 1989, and 1990. For each election date and party, percentages 
reflect vote share and (in parenthesis) seat share in parliament. Shaded cells indicate the party that won the majority in parliament in 
the corresponding election. The sequence of victors and electoral outcomes indicate prolonged periods with an advantage for one of 
the two contenders for control of the parliament (and government). 
* ΠΑΣΟΚ was the 3d party in this election. 